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 The Political Economy of the Global Crisis: Neo-liberalism, 
Financial Crises, and Emergent Authoritarian Liberalism in Asia* 
 
Bonn Juego1 and Johannes Dragsbaek Schmidt2 
Global Development Studies 
Aalborg University, Denmark 
 
 
Introduction 
 
he cacophony of crises in finance, production, food, environment, climate, 
energy, and governance over the last three decades culminated in the current 
deep recession. Since the subprime crisis became apparent in August 2007 with the 
US officially hitting recession by December of the same year, the epicenter of the 
financial earthquake has not left other economies unharmed, spilling over both in 
the developed and developing worlds. The crisis has thus become a global 
phenomenon, now to be recognized in history as the “Great Recession of 2008”. 
While crisis moments in capitalism have been viewed traditionally as a conjunctural 
phase, today actors from various ideological positions perceive the situation in the 
“Chinese way” as both danger and opportunity—i.e., an opportune moment to 
advance their respective interests. 
 
There are growing clamors for holding the US accountable for unleashing 
“financial weapons of mass destruction” and sparking a global market “tsunami” with 
the effect of disarming and impoverishing the marginalized even more. The financial 
crisis has further stagnated the real economy, created downturns and recessions in 
the US economy, and currently spreading to Europe, including Russia, and to Asia, 
Latin America, and Africa. It appears that 1929 is repeating itself with a world 
economy sliding even towards a new Great Depression. 
 
Under the cacophony of crises there are in fact simultaneous crises, all 
embedded in a systemic conjuncture of failure—a nexus between climate change, 
food and primary commodity crisis, oil depletion (speculative price hikes leading to 
environmental disasters), and doubts on governance legitimacy at both the global 
and state levels. The deep systemic causes of the unfolding social and 
environmental dramas are related to the growth of endless consumption, increasing 
levels of inequality, and the unwise institutional pathology which, to a very large 
extent, has been induced by US administrations. The neoliberal imperative has 
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depleted the natural life support system of the planet, disrupted hydrology and 
climate systems, and is indeed threatening human survival. Non-renewable natural 
and human resources are being exhausted. Climate change, which was earlier 
interpreted as a transnational ethical problem, has become a major political issue 
and might increasingly be identified as a security issue. This is especially the case 
when it is linked to the systemic failure of the current mode of production—no 
matter the type of political and institutional layer in which the market economy is 
embedded in. There are also horizontal links and close connections between the 
failures of capitalism and the depletion of oil. Scarcity of water and oil is already a 
security issue that has led to conflicts (Schmidt 2009). 
 
Crisis connotes “the turning point of a disease when an important change takes 
place, indicating either recovery or death”—or as Karl Polanyi (1944) would have 
said: a “double movement” whereby the expansion of market relations generates 
reactions from the society to protect itself from the consequences of the very 
operation of the allegedly self-regulating market. As to whether the cacophony of 
crises would lead to the recovery or death to the hegemonic capitalist, neo-liberal 
system is a political economy question to be determined by the unfolding struggle 
between the forces for recovery and the forces for change. 
 
This paper hopes to contribute to a reading of the political economy of the 
current global crisis with a focus on four interrelated themes. First, we situate the 
global crisis against the background of the relationship between crises and neo-
liberalism. Here we examine the constitutive role of crises in the evolution of neo-
liberalism, and argue that crises have been functional to capitalist reproduction. 
Second, we investigate the mechanisms of the recurrence of financial crises under 
conditions of global capitalism. In doing so, we present a structure-agency dynamics 
in finance capitalism, specifically, the structural tendency of financial markets to 
disintegrate that has been exacerbated by misbehavior of economic agents. Third, 
we look at the various crisis responses coming from opposing ideological positions. 
Here we argue that the responses of both pro- and anti-neoliberal forces are 
fundamentally the same through the years, re-articulating analyses and programs 
that have been pursued and advocated long before the global crisis. And fourth, we 
discuss the prospects and future of emergent authoritarian liberalism in East and 
Southeast Asia in the context of the current global crisis. Here we present a case for 
a probable strengthening and even acceleration of authoritarian liberalism in the 
region despite and because of the global crisis. 
 
 
The Constitutive Role of Crises in the Evolution of Neo-liberalism (1970s-
2009): Born out, Evolved through, and Died of Crises 
 
Crises have played a constitutive role in the history of capitalist development. Neo-
liberalism, which is the political-economic development paradigm that came to 
succeed the postwar Keynesian-Fordist, mass production-mass consumption national 
developmentalism phase in the global political economy of development, has also 
live by capitalism’s cycle of crises and booms. 
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The relationship between crises and neo-liberalism can be said to be either 
dysfunctional or functional, or both. Every time neo-liberalism comes into crisis, its 
critics, mostly coming from the left, get excited about its imminent collapse and the 
dawning of an alternative system. They view crises as having a dysfunctional effect 
to the system. However, the almost 40 year history of neo-liberalism suggests that 
crises have been more functional, rather than dysfunctional, to its perpetuation in 
terms of capitalist social relations, market-led development strategies, and neo-
liberal state restructuring. 
 
The constitutive role of crises in the life cycle of neo-liberalism refer to the fact 
that neo-liberalism: [a] was born out of the crises of the 1970s; [b] has evolved 
through a series of crises over the last 30 years; and [c] died of the cacophony of 
crises culminating in the current global economic crisis. 
 
Neo-liberalism: Born out of the crises of the 1970s 
 
Monocausal explanations about the emergence of neo-liberalism abound. These 
explanations do not go far enough simply because they fail to capture the complex 
processes involved and the dynamism of actors at play in the origin and evolution of 
neo-liberal globalization. 
 
Neo-liberal globalization was a product of the complex interaction of forces, 
events, and phenomena and their mutually reinforcing tendencies that became more 
conspicuous during the crisis of the mid-1970s. A recession hit the developed 
capitalist economies in 1973 and thereafter extended to the less developed 
countries. The OPEC oil crisis and the collapse of the Bretton Woods system shook 
the world. The internationalization of financial markets set in as a result of the 
widespread abandonment of foreign exchange controls. Third World countries 
resorted to massive foreign bank borrowings, were subjected to structural 
adjustment programs (SAPs), and were thus required to cut state expenditure, 
devalue their currencies, and remove barriers to the free movement of capital. They 
also had to abandon their dream to be active catching-up economies in a supposedly 
new international economic order as they had to shift from import-substitution to 
export promotion development strategies. The alternative and challenge posed by 
command economies proved to be empty as they too faced growing stagnation. 
Global production was restructured towards post-Fordism and multinational 
corporations (MNCs) were growing. Money had been delinked from the gold 
standard. “Sound” macroeconomic policies through privatization, deregulation, and 
liberalization became the norm that resulted in, among others, the weakening of 
trade unions, the cutting of state budgets for social welfare and other entitlements, 
and the destruction of the developing countries’ manufacturing and agricultural 
base. Information and communications technology (ICT), first installed in 1971 with 
the introduction of Intel’s microchip, was advancing and became the new “techno-
economic paradigm” shaping production patterns, financial investments, as well as 
social relations. 
 
As a result of the combined and uneven process of capitalist development in the 
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era of neo-liberal globalization, these developments triggered by the crisis of the 
1970s in the world economy, have shaped to a large extent, but did not entirely 
determine, the political, economic, and cultural relations at the grass-roots level. 
They have taken varying forms and effects from state to state within the 
geographical landscape of neo-liberalism. 
 
Neo-liberalism evolving through crisis—from crisis to crisis in the last 30 years 
 
According to some estimates from economists and think tanks, there have been 
over 100 financial crises in the world in the last 30 years. Yet, notwithstanding these 
statistics, it is palpably evident that majority of the peoples and societies in the 
world have long been in crisis. Crises have been inherent from the very birth of neo-
liberalism to a series of transformations it has undertaken over the decades. 
 
The global political economy of development since the 1960s could generally be 
characterized into three successive political-economic paradigms: national 
developmentalism from the postwar to the 1970s; the Washington Consensus from 
the 1980s to the mid-1990s; and the post-Washington Consensus from the mid-
1990s to present. Each of these paradigms came into serious restrategizing to cope 
with the major crises that confronted their legitimacy and very existence. True to 
form, as the Greek krisis aptly means “turning point in a disease”, every crisis 
compels neo-liberalism to innovate and to transform itself to secure its hegemony. 
 
The national developmentalism phase of capitalist development or the so-called 
“Golden Age” from the 1960s to 1973 took the forms of Fordist régime of 
accumulation in the US and Western Europe, “populist” import-substituting 
development in Latin America, and developmental states in East and Southeast Asia. 
By the early 1970s, the more than a decade “stability” that the Golden Age brought 
to the capitalist world came to a severe jolt and the mass production – mass 
consumption techno-economic paradigm had been structurally exhausted (see Perez 
2002). As stagflation reached unbearable heights by the mid-1970s, national 
developmentalism’s Keynesian approach of active state role in economic 
development through demand-side, fluctuations-mitigating monetary policies failed 
to realize the target of full employment and price stability and, more importantly, to 
sustain the harmony between productivity and real wage. The crises of the mid-
1970s thus gave way to transform capitalism into a new development paradigm 
referred to as global neo-liberalism. 
 
Neo-liberalism has often been divided into two distinct yet successive phases: the 
Washington Consensus (the first generation neo-liberal reforms) and the post-
Washington Consensus (the second generation reforms). The difference between 
the two phases cannot be simply reduced into a state-versus-market debate, in 
which the Washington Consensus is said to be the subordination of states to 
markets and the post-Washington Consensus, on the other hand, promotes a 
complementary relationship between them. The state-versus-market debate or a 
zero-sum game between states and markets is hollow. By merely taking the 
transformation of capitalism at face value, it misses the historical reality that active 
state interventions to make markets work have been present from the very 
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beginning of capitalist development. The difference between the two development 
paradigms lies not in form, but in the substantial agenda on goals and strategies. 
The Washington Consensus aimed to realize an open global market economy 
through structural adjustment programs and sound macroeconomic policies of 
privatization, deregulation, liberalization, and financial reforms. The post-Washington 
Consensus, on the other hand, is a project towards the realization of “universal 
convergence on competitiveness” through deep institutional and behavioral reforms 
and policies on labor market flexibility, human capital, and social capital (see 
Cammack 2009a). 
 
Aside from its dismal performance not only in the developed countries but 
especially in poor countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia marked by declining 
growth rates, rising unemployment and the informalization of labor, and race-to-the-
bottom wage policies and labor standards, the Washington Consensus got into a 
major ideological crisis. In particular, its market fundamentalism ideology—that 
markets are efficient and government intervention in the economy is bad—come to 
blows with Keynesian economists like Joseph Stiglitz. In 1989, John Williamson, 
recognized for coining the term “Washington Consensus”, introduced the 10 neo-
liberal policy reforms, namely: fiscal discipline, reordering of public expenditure 
priorities, tax reform, liberalization of interest rates, competitive exchange rate, 
trade liberalization, inward FDI liberalization, privatization, deregulation, and 
protection of property rights. But it only took less than four years for these reforms 
to be ideologically dismantled with the Stiglitz-led policy report on the East Asian 
Miracle (1993), which provided rich empirical evidence of eight high performing 
Asian economies (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, 
Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand) showing their staggering success between 1965 
and 1990 in realizing high growth and high equity through state intervention (World 
Bank 1993). 
 
Stiglitz advocated the Post-Washington Consensus project during his stint as 
senior vice president for development economics and chief economist of the World 
Bank from 1997 to 2000. With the aim of employing more policy instruments and 
broadening development goals, which is unlike the rather narrow macroeconomic 
policies and goals of the Washington Consensus, the post-Washington Consensus 
has promoted the use of “social variables” to make “markets work better” (Stiglitz 
1998). Both in policy and discourse, “social capital” has been peddled as the 
“missing link in development”. The use of social capital as a policy and ideological 
tool allows the World Bank and its allies to enlarge the circuit of capital, 
incorporating social variables that are traditionally left out in mainstream economics 
such as states, institutions, policy coordination, civil society, workers, culture, and 
family (Fine 2001; see also Cammack 2003). It likewise provided the Bank the 
framework to promote agenda for sustainable development, egalitarian 
development, and democratic development. However, this begs the question: More 
policy instruments and broader development goals for whom? The answer is 
straightforward: as the 2002 World Development Report title goes “institutions for 
markets”. 
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Cacophony of Crises: RIP Neo-liberalism (1980s-2008) 
 
As the post-Washington Consensus promotes more policy instruments and 
broader development goals, the current global crisis has revealed more crises and 
broader poverty curse. The world has been in crisis for longer than anyone would 
care to remember. It is currently under a cacophony of crises, among others, in: 
finance, food price (the Great Hunger of 2008), overaccumulation, overproduction, 
over- and/or under-consumption, climate change, ecological degradation, political 
legitimacy, global governance, oil and energy, and water. The recent global crisis is 
nothing but a culmination of the neo-liberal bust, of the cacophony of structural 
crises in the past now simultaneously wreaking havoc to economies, societies, 
families, and human life itself. 
 
Has neo-liberalism died of the current cacophony of crises? Of course, the 
answer depends on what one means of neo-liberalism. We argue that neo-liberalism 
has died but not the capitalist system. 
 
By “neo-liberalism” we generally refer to that specific form (market 
fundamentalism), that specific class relation (hegemony of capital over labor), that 
specific process of capital accumulation (using money to make more money), that 
specific configuration of capitalism (liberalism with new configuration), that specific 
phase of capitalist development (postwar), those specific sets of 10 economic reform 
policies enshrined in the SAPs (Washington Consensus). Neo-liberalism is basically 
“liberalism” with “neo”/new configurations. It is this neo-liberal form and 
configuration of capitalism that has died, but not the substance of capitalism as a 
process of capital accumulation and relations in which labor is subordinated to 
capital. 
 
The proponents of neo-liberalism are all too aware of the crisis-prone and 
conflict-ridden nature of the capitalist system. Hence, neo-liberalism has always 
been promoted as a strategy for continued market-led development and at the same 
time a blueprint for crisis management. They always look at crisis moments as 
perfect moments to further entrench, and never retreat from, neo-liberal institutions 
and practices. 
 
The rather upbeat attitude of the enthusiastic apologists for further neo-
liberalization must have come from their faith in the invisible hand, in the supposed 
harmony-creating mechanisms of the market. The seeming complacency may have 
come from the historical fact that recessions do not last that long enough as to bring 
about the collapse of the system. In a recent study by the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER), incidents of recessions in post-World War II, from 1948 
to 2001, lasted only from six to 18 months (NBER 2008, as cited in Isidore 2008). 
Interestingly, the UN’s Final Report of the Commission of Experts of the President of 
the United Nations General Assembly on Reforms on the International Monetary and 
Financial System (2009) observes that the short and easy recovery from previous 
recessions—i.e., short and easy enough as to take the needed reforms to be 
enforced—might be a crucial reason for the recurrence of crises. 
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Take for example the neo-liberal responses to successive crises since the 1980s. 
When Latin America was on a deep debt crisis in 1982, IMF and pro-capitalist 
political forces imposed SAPs as conditionalities for rolling over debts, a harmful 
consequence of which was massive deindustrialization in the every country in the 
region. In addition, the responses to several financial crises in the last 20 years—
namely, Scandinavia (early 1990s), Mexico (1994), East & Southeast Asia (1997), 
Russia (1998), Argentina (2001), Turkey (2001-02), US subprime mortgage (2007), 
the Great Recession (2008)—have had as their overarching theme an open 
“international financial architecture” through regulatory institutions that guarantee 
the domestic and global rights of capital. Despite acknowledgement of the 
usefulness of some capital controls (like in the cases of Chile and Malaysia), the IMF 
and neo-liberal forces further promoted policies toward effective regulation to 
smoothen adjustment to the supposed openness of the international financial system 
(e.g. IMF’s surveillance mechanism). 
 
Further, the 2007-2009 US Subprime/Credit crisis was responded through 
bailouts and stimulus packages. In his account of the history of neo-liberalism, David 
Harvey (2005) sees neo-liberalism, as has been designed in the post-WWII, as an 
attempt at consolidating and restoring capitalist class power. It was a Reagan-
Thatcher configuration of capitalism, a new phase of an ideological assault on the 
working class. The Bush-Paulson-Bernanke-Obama bailouts program, for instance, is 
therefore reminiscent of the birth of neo-liberalism. It is an attempt to consolidate 
and restore the power of corporations, assure the ascendancy of finance capital, and 
hence save capitalism from its own destruction. As Wade and Veneroso (1998) puts 
it, citing the Asian crisis as a case in point, but still very apt today: “Financial crises 
have always caused transfers of ownership and power to those who keep their own 
assets intact and who are in a position to create credit.” They went on to recall the 
memorable lines attributed to Andrew Mellon, an American banker and former 
Secretary of Treasury during the Great Depression: “In a depression assets return to 
their rightful owners.” 
 
 
Structural Instability of Financial Markets and the Greedy Economic Elites 
 
What the global crisis has unveiled is the unfettered ascendancy of finance capital 
and its eventual burst, gluttonously squeezing out value out of already created value 
at the expense of the stagnation of the real economy, and hence prospective 
technological innovation and employment. The unfolding world economic crisis 
“manifests (the) huge, unresolved problems in the real economy that have been 
literally papered over by debt for decades, as well as a financial crunch of a depth 
unseen in the postwar epoch. It is the mutually reinforcing interaction between 
weakening capital accumulation and the disintegration of the financial sector that 
has made the downward slide so intractable for policy makers and its potential for 
catastrophe so evident” (Brenner 2009). As a result of neo-liberal finance relaxation 
(cf. Panitch and Konings 2009 on “Myths of Neoliberal Deregulation”), finance capital 
has ventured into unbridled speculative adventurism instead of acting as lifeblood of 
the real economy. For instance, the so-called “sovereign wealth funds” (SWFs), 
which gained prominence in the 2008 World Economic Forum due to its growing 
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financial clout now estimated to be around USD 4 trillion, are state assets coming 
from natural resource earnings, surplus, and savings. These funds were traditionally 
utilized to serve and strengthen the productive sector. But an investigation of their 
investments today would point to the fact that almost all of the assets are allocated 
to financial services and instruments in the forms of stocks, bonds, and equities and 
just a few single-digit percentages for infrastructure projects and the productive 
sector. These include the big SWFs in Alaska, Alberta, Abu Dhabi, Norway, and 
Singapore. 
 
The shifting roles of money in the development of the real economy in the 
history of global capitalism is best depicted by Arthur Cecil Pigou in his Veil of Money 
(1949, as cited in Perez 2002: 6): 
 
In the years preceding the First World War there were in common use among 
economists a number of metaphors . . . ‘Money is a wrapper in which goods 
come’; ‘Money is the garment draped round the body of economic life’; ‘money is 
a veil behind which the action of real economic forces is concealed’ . . . 
During the 1920s and 1930s . . . money, the passive veil, took on the 
appearance of an evil genius; the garment became a Nessus shirt; the wrapper a 
thing liable to explode. Money, in short, after being little or nothing, was now 
everything . . . 
Then with the Second World War, the tune changed again. Manpower, 
equipment and organization once more came into their own. The role of money 
dwindled to insignificance.... 
 
Far from Polanyi’s (1957) description of money, together with land and labor, as 
a “fictitious commodity” because it was not “produced for sale” (see also Jessop 
2007), the view towards money in this epoch of neo-liberal globalization has gone 
back to its 1920s and 1930s moment. The accumulation process at this time entails 
money’s self-reproduction through speculative activities and other innovative 
financial instruments like derivatives, which Warren Buffet (2002) regards as lethal 
“financial weapons of mass destruction” and “time bombs” susceptible to explode 
and cause the implosion of the entire economic system. Interestingly, it is at times 
when money was treated as “everything” that major crises occur and recur—that is, 
the Great Depression of 1929 and the Great Recession of 2008. 
 
Several important complementary mechanisms can also be identified that 
contributed to the domination of finance and the stagnation of the real economy, 
namely: the vicious effect of compound interests, the relationship of technology with 
finance, and the natural instability of financial markets (Reinert 2008). 
 
Compound Interests 
 
Borrowers often underestimate the effect of compound interests in financial 
transactions. Left unattended, especially at this moment of a fiat monetary system 
that has replaced the gold standard, compound interests could grow ad infinitum. 
The English economist, Richard Price (1769, as cited in Reinert 2008) made an 
intelligent calculation: “A shilling put out at 6% compound interest at our Saviour’s 
birth would . . . have increased to a greater sum than the whole solar system could 
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hold, supposing it a sphere equal in diameter to the diameter of Saturn’s orbit.” 
 
The finance historian Michael Hudson (2000, 2007), who has been studying the 
economic origins of modern civilization, made an important point that demands 
recall today: 
 
The limits-to-growth warnings proved to be premature a generation ago, but one 
cannot say the same thing for the growth of debts/savings at compound interest 
year after year. Any statistician plotting the growth of an economy’s debt quickly 
finds that existing trends are not sustainable. The growth of debt has become 
the major cause of economic downturns, austerity and financial polarization, 
creating financial crashes and, in severe cases, social crises. (Hudson 2000: 310-
311) 
 
Indeed, what differentiates money from other forms of capital and things is the fact 
that money is limitless (see Harvey 1982 [2007]). 
 
Technological Revolutions and Financial Bubbles 
 
In her groundbreaking historical study of the changing relationship between 
technological revolutions and finance capital, the Venezuelan economist Carlota 
Perez (2002) has shown the existence of remarkable dynamic regularities and 
recurrent sequences of change in the capitalist system. In particular, financial 
markets are said to have a “love affair” with a new breakthrough technology. This 
was evident, among others, with the boom-bust cycles of the US Steel Corporation’s 
market shares at the beginning of the 20th century as the techno-economic paradigm 
was transitioning from the “Age of Steel, Electricity and Heavy Engineering” to the 
“Age of Oil, Automobiles and Mass Production” and of the Microsoft Corporation at 
the deployment period of the ICT from the 1970s until the bursting of the dot-com 
bubble in 2001. 
 
The history of technological revolutions, which is inescapably linked with the 
power of finance capital, is one of continuity of the nature and logic of the capitalist 
system, of recurrence of its historical structure. At the irruption of a technological 
revolution, configured in a particular techno-economic paradigm, all existing 
industries and activities are modernized. The process of diffusion of this historical 
moment across the economy constitutes a great surge of development. Each surge 
that approximately lasts for a half century has two distinct periods (namely, the 
installation period and the deployment period), which are mediated by a turning 
point. Each of these periods in recurring sequence then undergoes four phases (with 
each phase lasting around a decade): irruption, frenzy – turning point – synergy and 
maturity. As a result, this massive economic transformation involves complex 
processes of social assimilation which may also require the adaptation of socio-
institutional framework to each paradigm, and the eventual need for a process of 
“institutional creative destruction” for the introduction and diffusion of the next 
technological revolution (Perez 2002; see also Juego 2009). For Perez and other 
Schumpeterian economists, the collapse of the Internet bubble is no cause for 
surprise. The kind of euphoria brought about by the excitement in new technology 
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and in financial mania in the global economy, eventually leading to a recession, is 
nothing unprecedented. The same logic of the changing relationship between 
technological revolutions and finance capital that shapes the pattern of economic 
cycles can be extrapolated to the current global recession. Reinforcing this structural 
logic in finance and technology are the greedy and corrupt economic elites like the 
Parmalat speculative activities and the Enron fraudulent practices just a few years 
ago and that of the egoistic and egotistic “too-big-to-fail” financial institutions like 
AIG and Lehman Brothers recently. 
 
Inherent Instability of Financial Markets 
 
The post-Keynesian economist Hyman Minsky (1992) makes an important 
hypothesis on the inherent instability of the financial markets that can help explain 
the logic of repeated financial crises under capitalism. Well-known for his 
contribution on “Ponzi finance”, Minsky also highlights the idea of “endogenous 
instability” which means “that stability in the economic system generates behaviours 
that produce fragility, and increasing fragility makes the system more prone to an 
unstable response to change in financial or other conditions that are relevant to the 
return on investment projects” (Kregel 2008: 1). In other words, sustained periods of 
stability as such inevitably produce increasing fragility. This analysis, however, may 
be more suitable in the case of developed economies with “advanced” financial 
system like the US and the Europe where banks and other credit actors play 
prominent roles in financial transactions. In developing countries like the Philippines 
and India, for example, where majority of work are in the informal sector, 
businesses are established and conducted through channels other than banks such 
as borrowing money from friends and family and from personal savings. 
 
Bankers are believed to be inherently pessimistic towards the prospective returns 
of borrowers. This is even more the case in poor countries with fragile institutions. It 
is perhaps safe to assume that lending agents are more skeptical in poor countries 
because of the high risks involved. Nevertheless, the rich and the poor equally feel 
the scourge of Ponzi finance, which is a type of finance where expected revenues 
cannot even afford either principal or interest payments resulting in the subjection of 
agents to increasing debt. Third World debt is a classic and ugly example of a Ponzi 
finance scheme perpetuating the unjust process of what Gunnar Myrdal refers to as 
“perverse backwashes” in which funds tend to flow from the poor to the rich. 
 
Subprime loans are considered a Ponzi scheme in which financial institutions 
redefine the rules of the game where, especially in times of crisis, they no longer 
compete for market share but instead pull out or withdraw from the transaction in 
order to be more liquid. Under this condition of liquidity preference, even “sound” 
projects are refused credits, and hence a downward spiral starts (Reinert 2008). The 
repeal of the 1933 Glass-Steagall Act with the legislation of Financial Services 
Modernization Act in 1999 (see Panitch and Konings 2009) resulted in the recurrence 
of Ponzi schemes. This banking “deregulation” law changed the historical role of 
banks of being responsible for assessing creditworthiness and including risks in their 
balance sheets. Credit rating agencies have replaced their traditional role. It has 
been revealed during the subprime crisis that banks have been selling “junk 
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packages” of subprime loans that were not on their balance sheets (see Kregel 
2007, 2008). 
 
In his statement at the hearing of the US House Financial Services Committee on 
“The State of the Bond Insurance Industry”, William Ackman (2008: 2), managing 
member of the investment adviser Pershing Square Capital Management, has 
pinpointed the problem in the US bond insurance industry: 
 
The poor decisions of holding company executives are the primary cause for the 
bond insurers’ problems, but the rating agencies also share responsibility.  
 
The rating agencies encouraged the bond insurers to diversify into structured 
finance risks and gave them additional rating credit for doing so. The rating 
agencies understated the risks of the new strategy while earning much higher 
fees for rating these structures.  
 
The rating agencies’ profits soared along with the growth in structured finance 
issuance. Insurance regulators relied on the rating agencies and management 
teams to assess the risk of these new structures. 
 
The rating agencies were paid by the issuers of these securities and helped in 
structuring these exotic instruments to meet the ratings agencies’ insufficient 
standards for Triple A ratings. The rating agencies only received their full fees if 
they approved the Triple A ratings for these transactions. 
 
The combination of aggressive risk taking by management, poor judgment by 
conflicted rating agencies, and over-reliance by regulatory authorities on rating 
agency judgment led to the current situation. 
 
This revelation from an insider manifests again the ineptitude, corruption, and 
unrestrained greed of the economic elites, exacerbating as well as accelerating the 
structural imperatives of the endogenous instability and inherent fragility of the 
financial markets. 
 
 
Fundamentally the Same Responses to the Global Crisis 
 
There have been varying responses from individuals, states, and global institutions 
to the current crisis which could nevertheless be divided into, broadly speaking, 
three general schools of thought: Schumpeterian, Keynesian, and Marxist. The 
Schumpeterian responses are proposals coming from evolutionary economists who 
basically argue to “let the system burn out alone”. The Keynesian responses—which 
have in a paradox received support even among “free market” ideologues—come 
from international organizations and individual governments trying to “repair the 
system”. And the Marxist responses are from organic, critical intellectuals, civil 
society, and global justice movements—who have long been criticizing the current 
mode of production linked with the destruction of the environment—pushing to 
“replace the system”. 
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The Schumpeterians are perhaps the most complacent and even welcoming of 
the crisis for two reasons. First is that the history of booms and crises is in the logic 
of business cycles. And second is that, as Joseph Schumpeter (1939) observes in his 
study of business cycles: “Times of innovation ... are times of effort and sacrifice, of 
work for the future, while the harvest comes after.... The harvest is gathered under 
recessive symptoms and with more anxiety than rejoicing.... [During] recession ... 
much dead wood disappears.” 
 
The Great Recession of 2008 is said to have ushered in a Keynesian redux 
especially in economic policy-making. Keynesians, together with their post-Keynesian 
colleagues, call for the repair of the system but without encouraging the irrationally 
exuberant behavior that caused the crisis. They have various proposals ranging from 
the use of monetary policy to countercyclical fiscal policy, to the enforcement of 
policy coordination at national and global levels, to the establishment of the New 
Bretton Woods, and to the creation of a world currency unit. But what is striking 
among the Keynesian proposals was John Maynard Keyne’s (1933 [1972]) idea of 
national self-sufficiency with a call for the nationalization of finance: “Ideas, 
knowledge, science, hospitality, travel—these are the things which should of their 
nature be international. But let goods be homespun whenever it is reasonably and 
conveniently possible, and, above all, let finance be primarily national.” 
 
The Marxists have been the most vocal about the inherent crisis and 
contradictions of capitalism. They see that capitalism lives by crises and will be 
accompanied by crises to its grave. Basically, Marx’s theory of crisis has two 
interrelated components: crisis of overproduction and the tendency of the rate of 
profit to fall. First, since capitalism is a system of production for profits and not for 
needs, there’s a structural tendency for overcapacity which, in turn, leads to a crisis 
of realizing surplus value. In other words, too much is produced for the capitalists to 
sell at a profit. And second, there is a crisis in extracting surplus value, where there 
is a mismatch between the increasing amount of total capital invested and the 
unchanging amount of surplus value generated. The disembedding of finance capital 
from the real economy of production is a wily attempt at overcoming this crisis 
through “innovative” and speculative financial instruments extracting value out of 
already exhausted value. As Marx (1858) puts it: “The real barrier of capitalist 
production is capital itself”. Marxists argue that no amount of Schumpeterian and 
Keynesian tinkering with the capitalist system can resolve the fundamental 
contradictions inherent in capitalism. As Marx and Engels (1848) asserted: 
Capitalism is “like a sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the 
nether world whom he has called up by his spells”. The fundamental contradiction of 
capitalist reproduction therefore is the reproduction of “social antagonisms that 
spring from the natural laws of capitalist production”. In this moment of capitalist 
crisis again, Marxists thus call for the overthrow of the system to be replaced by a 
democratic socialist alternative. 
 
In their respective responses to the global crisis, are there significant changes at 
all to the visions and strategies of global governance institutions (specifically the 
World Bank, the IMF, and their G-20 allies), regional organizations (like the Asian 
Development Bank [ADB] and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN]) 
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the states (in East and Southeast Asia), and the social movements (civil society and 
global justice movements)? We argue that their respective responses to the current 
global crisis are exactly the same or mere reassertions of the same strategies, 
perspectives, ideology, and visions ever since, with or without the crisis.  
 
The World Bank, IMF and their G-20 Allies: Using the global crisis to their advantage 
 
Over the last decade, the neo-liberal global governance institutions—the World 
Bank, the IMF, and the WTO—have been facing severe crisis of legitimacy and 
credibility. The disillusionment with these institutions come from the series of 
political-economic crises they themselves have inflicted on countries that they were 
supposed to manage, restructure, and develop. In addition to the not so well-
publicized budgetary crisis, failed projects and prescriptions of the World Bank (see 
Woods 2006; Bello 2006), the dramas and revelations during the successive 
resignations of Joseph Stiglitz and Ravi Kanbur in the early 2000s demonstrated the 
Bank’s strong neo-classical and neo-liberal stance. The IMF received crushing blows 
from heavily indebted countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia promising to never 
again be subjected to neo-liberal hardship. The WTO has been struggling for dear 
life as the almost five-year long Doha Development Trade Round collapsed in mid-
2006. But with the current global crisis, predictions about the imminent demise of 
these neo-liberal multilateral institutions appear premature, if not unfounded. In a 
concerted effort, they have risen up to the challenge of the crisis, not to admit and 
rectify errors in the past, but to reassert their presumed legitimacy and raison d'être. 
 
Writing in July 2007—barely a month before the US subprime mortgage crisis 
became apparent—in commemoration of the 10th anniversary of the 1997 Asian 
crisis, the scholar-activist Walden Bello (2007), remarked about the “demise of the 
IMF”: 
 
“Never again” became the slogan of a number of the affected governments. The 
Thaksin government in Thailand declared its “financial independence” from the 
IMF after paying off its debts in 2003, vowing never to return to the Fund. 
Indonesia has said it will pay off all its debts to the IMF by 2008. The Philippines 
has refrained from contracting new loans from the Fund, while Malaysia defied it 
by imposing capital controls at the height of the crisis. 
 
Ironically, then, the IMF has become one of the key victims of the 1997 debacle. 
This arrogant institution of some 1,000 elite economists never recovered from 
the severe crisis of legitimacy and credibility that overtook it—a crisis that was 
deepened by the bankruptcy of its star pupil Argentina in 2002. In 2006, Brazil 
and Argentina, following Thailand’s example, paid off all their debts to the Fund 
in order to achieve financial independence. Then Hugo Chavez let the other shoe 
drop by announcing that Venezuela would leave the IMF and the World Bank. 
This boycott by its biggest borrowers has translated into a budget crisis for the 
IMF. 
 
But in less than two years, the global crisis has turned the tide, and it has also tide 
the IMF over. Perhaps the happiest person in the world at this time of crisis is none 
other than Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director of the IMF, who 
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triumphantly expressed during the G-20 Press Conference on 2 April 2009 that the: 
“IMF is back. Today you get the proof when you read the communiqué, each 
paragraph, or almost each paragraph—let’s say the important ones—are in one way 
or another related to IMF work” (IMF 2009b).  
 
Ironically, the very same countries that suffered from decades of IMF 
conditionalities identified by Bello—specifically, Argentina, Brazil, and Indonesia 
which are now part of the G-20 following the G-7’s expansion in 1999 to include 
emerging economies—were the ones who breathed new life to the Fund and thereby 
affirmed its legitimacy and relevance. The G-20 Summits in London (April 2009) and 
Pittsburgh (September 2009) have affirmed the International Financial Institutions’ 
(IFIs) “important role in supporting (G-20’s) work to secure sustainable growth, 
stability, job creation, development and poverty reduction. It is therefore critical that 
(they) continue to increase their relevance, responsiveness, effectiveness and 
legitimacy” (G-20 2009d: para 5.). In addition, the new project for economic 
cooperation enshrined in the G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced 
Growth will be assisted and “supported by IMF and World Bank analyses” (G-20 
2009d: para 3; see also G-20 2009a, 2009b, 2009c.). This in effect makes the G20 
another strategic institution, notwithstanding what they proclaim as an “informal 
forum”, through which the World Bank and IMF agenda are expressed and, more 
importantly, legitimized. However, despite the G20’s claim that they enjoy 
legitimacy, credibility, and economic weight, the hundreds of vulnerable and 
marginalized poor countries outside the Group are not represented and hence 
neglected. The crisis that could have killed the IMF and World is also the one that 
has resurrected it. And the countries that were supposed to disdain them were also 
the ones who retain them. 
 
While the world awaited the G20 Summit in London in April 2009 and some 
hoped for a possibility of change in the global economic architecture, one could 
easily predict the crisis responses of the G20 member countries, especially those of 
the World Bank and the IMF. A close reading of the policy prescriptions of the World 
Bank and IMF re the global crisis documented prior to the G20 London Summit could 
already give the idea of their agenda for the Summit: that is, the crisis offers an 
opportunity not to retreat from the global neo-liberal project but to further advance 
a truly open international financial architecture and competitive markets that are 
coordinated, regulated, and enforced by them at the global scale. 
 
The World Bank’s, Global Monitoring Report 2009: A Development Emergency 
echoes exactly the same neo-liberal program and project that it has been pursuing 
from the early 1990s to present (see Cammack 2003, 2009a, 2009b). In particular, 
the Bank’s six priority areas are: [1] fiscal response to ensure macroeconomic 
stability; [2] prominent role of the private sector in investment, business, 
enterprises, finance, trade, and business to improve stability of the financial system; 
[3] “leveraging the private sector’s role in the financing and delivery of services”; [4] 
prescribing national governments to “hold firm against rising protectionist pressures 
and maintain an open international trade and finance system”; [5] expediting the 
completion of the Doha negotiations; and [6] assertion of the “key role” of the World 
Bank and the IMF “in bridging the large financing gap for developing countries 
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resulting from the slump in private capital flows, including using their leverage ability 
to help revive private flows” and thereby calling for the necessity for them to “have 
the mandate, resources, and instruments to support an effective global response to 
the global crisis” (World Bank 2009: xii). A couple of days before the London 
Summit, World Bank President Robert Zoellick (31 March 2009, prior to the G-20 
Meeting) repeated the same script pushing for an agenda to revitalize the 
multilaterals, namely: “a WTO monitoring system” to complete the Doha 
negotiations; a monitoring role for the IMF to assess stimulus packages; and “an 
overhaul of the financial regulatory and supervisory system” in which authority over 
regulation rests on national governments under an expanded Financial Stability 
Forum, which works “with the IMF and the World Bank group on implementation” 
(Cammack 2009b). 
 
IMF’s Initial Lessons of the Crisis for the Global Architecture and the IMF released 
in February 2009 sees the crisis as “a unique opportunity … to make progress on 
seemingly intractable issues”. Here the IMF has resolved not to miss the moment. 
While the IMF acknowledges that “(t)he crisis has revealed flaws in key dimensions 
of the current global architecture”, the bottom line is that they uphold long held 
principles and propose to impose same policies again and again such as: [1] 
surveillance mechanisms that were first articulated after the 1997 Asian crisis and 
the dot-com bust in 2001 to allow them to detect vulnerabilities and risks at an early 
stage for their timely intervention; [2] that they be strengthened and mandated “to 
take leadership in responding to systemic concerns about the international 
economy”; [3] rules governing cross-border finance;  [4] that they be given “readily 
available resources” “for liquidity support and easing external adjustment” (IMF 
2009a: 13). 
 
The Asian Development Bank and the ASEAN: Banking-as-usual for the private 
sector and for free flow of goods, services and investment 
 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) proactively responded to the fiscal needs of 
its developing member countries affected by the global crisis through “lending 
assistance” amounting to USD 32 billion for the period 2009-2010 (ADB 2009). As 
expected, it is banking-as-usual for the ADB—these are “loans” extended to needy 
Asian countries to be paid from five to 15 years whose interest rates are determined 
by the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) either on a floating-rate or fixed-rate 
basis (see ADB 2008). Typical of ADB’s agenda and priorities for the private sector 
since time immemorial, 44% of the loan are for programs to stimulate growth and 
restore private sector confidence; 35% for countercyclical support facility (a new 
short-term loan extended to middle-income member countries) for structural reforms 
toward an attractive investment climate; 12% for trade facilitation to support private 
sector development; but only 6% for infrastructure and a measly 3% for social 
protection (see ADB 2009). Of course, the debtor governments (read: the people) 
guarantee these loans, absorb all the risks, and accountable even when the private 
sector misbehaves and fails. 
 
A month prior to the G20 London Summit, the ASEAN Heads of 
States/Governments had its 14th Summit in Cha-am Hua Hin, Thailand and had a 
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caucus on 1 March 2009 to discuss the global economic and financial crisis and come 
up with their agenda which Indonesia, the only ASEAN member country of the G20, 
is ought to convey to the G20 leaders. What the caucus’ final statement declares are 
exactly of the same theme, and even using the same words, that the World Bank, 
IMF, and ADB spelled out in their respective responses to the global crisis. The 
ASEAN leaders: concurred [a] “to restore market confidence and ensure continued 
financial stability”; [b] “welcomed expansionary macroeconomic policies, including 
fiscal stimulus” and “measures to support private sector, particularly SMEs”; [c] 
“stressed the importance of coordinating policies”; [d] “reaffirmed their 
determination to ensure the free flow of goods, services and investment, and 
facilitate movement of business persons, professionals, talents and labour, and freer 
flow of capital”; [d] “agreed to stand firm against protectionism and to refrain from 
introducing and raising new barriers”; [e] “agreed to intensify efforts to ensure a 
strong Doha Development Agenda outcome”; [f] “develop a more robust and 
effective surveillance mechanism”; [g] “welcomed the new Asian Bond Markets 
Initiative Roadmap”; [h] called for “more coordinated action by both developed and 
developing countries … to restore financial stability and ensure the continued 
functioning of financial markets to provide support to growth”; and [i] “called for a 
bold and urgent reform of the international financial system” (ASEAN 2009c). This 
declaration is simply coherent with ASEAN’s commitment towards the neo-liberal 
ideals of free trade, competitiveness, and an open market economy being 
institutionalized over the last decade and will be pursued in the years to come. With 
the adoption of the ASEAN Charter at the end of 2008, ASEAN member countries 
have expressed their commitment to deepen Asian integration, patterned after the 
EU, towards the creation of a single market and productive space by 2015. Rather 
than being cautious of the promises of free trade under conditions of the current 
crisis, ASEAN has had sealed investment and free trade agreements with countries in 
the Asia Pacific (Australia and New Zealand), East Asia (South Korea and China), and 
South Asia (India) almost every month from February to August 2009.  
 
UN Commission of Experts on Reforms of the International Monetary and Financial 
Systems: Heterodoxy Rearticulated 
 
On November 2008, the President of the UN General Assembly convened a 
Commission of Experts to study the global crisis and propose reforms on the 
international monetary and financial systems. The experts include a school of 
heterodox economists and activists, namely: the Keynesian Joseph Stiglitz as chair, 
the critical political economist Jomo KS and the Hirschmanesque José Antonio 
Ocampo as members, the post-Keynesian/Minskyian Jan Kregel as rapporteur, and 
the World Social Forum activist François Houtart as special representative. To those 
familiar with the works and advocacies of these experts, the 139-page final report 
can be read as a summary of the essentials of the Commission members’ lifelong 
experiences and writings as policy-makers, scholars, and activists. They articulated 
in the deliberations and put in the final report their long held heterodox economic 
ideas and critic against neo-liberal globalization formulated in words that meet the 
exigencies of the current global crisis. 
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As longtime critics of market fundamentalism that has shaped mainstream 
development policy and discourse for the last 35 years or so, the Commission of 
Experts started their conclusion with a remark that “the crisis is man-made” (UN 
2009: 132): 
 
The crisis is not just a once in a century accident, something that just happened to 
the economy, something that could not be anticipated, less alone avoided. We 
believe that, to the contrary, the crisis is man-made: it was the result of mistakes by 
the private sector and misguided and failed policies of the public.  
 
Eight common themes have been laid out in the analysis: [1] growing inequalities in 
most countries in the world; [2] the global scope of the crisis that requires 
responses from a global perspective; [3] existence of large global asymmetries, 
specifically asymmetric responses between the developed and developing countries 
that perpetuates the unjust transfer of funds from the poor to the rich countries that 
have caused the conflagration in the first place; [4] inadequate financial regulation; 
[5] the mismatch between the pace of economic globalization and the development 
of political institutions both at the national and international levels; [6] the 
pervasiveness of externalities, an instance of market failure that renders the 
“efficient market hypothesis” meaningless—this in turn calls for coordination of 
global financial regulation and the availability of resources especially for the 
developing economies to conduct countercyclical fiscal policies; [7] financial 
“innovations” that failed to manage risks and enhanced problems of information 
asymmetries, and the problems of too-big-to-fail, too-big-to-be-resolved banks as 
results of inadequate competition laws and enforcement deficiency; and [8] crisis as 
both opportunity (to engage in reforms) and danger (power structures reinforcing 
inequalities and inequities). 
 
The Commission then went on to propose a large number of recommendations 
taking their heterodox economics perspective as point of departure including: [a] 
creation of institutions to coordinate global economic policy such as Global Economic 
Coordination Council and International Panel of Experts; [b] the need for a New 
Credit Facility with governance structure responsive to the needs of both lenders and 
borrowers; [c] reform in the systems of risk management, including the sharing and 
transferring of risks from those less able to bear them to those more able to do; and 
[d] addressing the problem of insufficient aggregate demand even after the crisis 
which makes it imperative for fundamental reforms such as a new global reserve 
system and for a careful “exit strategy” from existing stimulus policies. 
 
Global Civil Society: “We told you so!” 
 
“We told you so” has become a prominent slogan of the critics of neo-liberal 
globalization as the cacophony of crises exploded and shook the world. The analysis 
of the global civil society expressed in various people’s forums and channels since 
the 1990s has been vindicated by the global crisis. They are therefore proposing 
alternative futures that they have long been articulating, hoping that the global crisis 
would usher in a much more caring and just world. For instance, the World Social 
Forum (WSF) and the Asia-Europe People’s Forum (AEPF), which are broad networks 
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of civil society and social movements across the globe, have looked at the global 
crisis as “an opportunity for another world” and “an historic opportunity for 
transformation”, respectively. The WSF is said to have been “revitalized by the 
global crisis” as renewed interests in their call for “Another World Is Possible” arise 
(Osava 2008). The AEPF likewise continues to critic neo-liberal globalization and 
reiterates the policy reforms and programs in the areas of politics, economics, and 
culture constantly formulated in their biennial Forums since 1998 in accordance with 
their founding principles for a people-centered peaceful, developed, and democratic 
world (see AEPF 2009). 
 
Yet, the global civil society is confronted with a paradox at this moment of the 
global crisis: the crisis simultaneously weakens and activates the social forces of 
change and alternatives. While the global civil society has been vindicated, at least 
in their analysis and call for change, the pro-neo-liberal forces have been in concert 
in recovering the system and the maintenance of the status quo (see Bienefeld 
2007; Schmidt 2009). If there is an increasing need for change to the crisis-prone 
global capitalist system, the forces of alternative futures are faced with a Gramscian 
and a Marxist realpolitik and render them incapable to eliminate the recurrent social 
and economic disasters endemic to the capitalist system. 
 
This is the great Gramscian realpolitik challenge to the alternative forces: “The 
crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is dying and the new cannot be born; 
in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear” (Gramsci 1971). 
And once again, it is as if Marx (1852) is speaking to the alternative forces of today 
about the great, all-time contradiction in struggle for social change:  
 
(People) make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do 
not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing 
already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead 
generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. And just as they 
seem to be occupied with revolutionizing themselves and things, creating 
something that did not exist before, precisely in such epochs of revolutionary 
crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service, borrowing 
from them names, battle slogans, and costumes in order to present this new 
scene in world history in time-honored disguise and borrowed language. 
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Emergent Authoritarian Liberalism in Asia: Authoritarian Polity, Market 
Economy 
 
An emergent political-economic regime is being institutionalized in East and 
Southeast Asia. It is called “authoritarian liberalism”, where authoritarian polities are 
embedded in a market economy. It is also within this framework that the Asian 
region is responding and progressing during the global crisis. 
 
Asian Political Economy: Neoliberal Economies Embedded in Authoritarian Polities 
 
There are two mainstream theses that cannot explain contemporary political 
economy of East and Southeast Asia under conditions of global capitalism: first is the 
“democratic peace” that claims that democracies do not go to wars against each 
other; and second is “modernization theory” of the hyperglobalist that says that 
globalization necessarily creates a world of liberal democracies. 
 
The US-led war on terror, launched in Asia in early 2000s as a response to the 
9/11 terror attacks, seems to have provided “exceptional” powers to Asian 
governments, expanding their discretionary powers of detention and surveillance. 
Asian (semi-)authoritarian regimes have become strategic sites of opposing 
terrorism. The human rights situation in Asia after the events of 9/11 is alarming. In 
recent years, Asia has hit the headlines with the numerous cases of outright killing 
of human rights defenders and journalists in the Philippines and the heartless killing 
and harassment of monks and their sympathizers in Burma. These killings pose 
serious threats to freedom of expression and constitute a violation of the right to 
life. 
 
Post-9/11 Asia is by far a region of authoritarianisms—a security complex of 
authoritarianisms. Regional stability seems to come from a “peaceful coexistence 
among authoritarianisms,” rather than among democracies, following the policy of 
non-interference which every government in the region normatively proclaims. The 
region is progressing towards the resurgence, or deepening of, a variation of 
authoritarianisms: (semi-)authoritarian regimes in China, Malaysia and Singapore; 
the military government in Myanmar; the influence and prominent role of the 
military and monarchy in Thailand; the monarchy in Brunei; one-party rule in China, 
Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam; a military general leadership, culture of impunity, and 
continued militarization in Aceh and Papua in Indonesia; and an administration 
predisposed to authoritarianism and the militarisation of the cities and countryside in 
the Philippines (see Juego 2008a). Time and again, numerous researches conducted 
to guide policies for protecting human rights have identified the conditions under 
which governments and people are most likely to commit large scale murder, 
torture, and arbitrary imprisonment. They conclude that authoritarianism, alongside 
war and poverty, can lead to large scale human rights violations. 
 
The toppling of two military regimes—Ferdinand Marcos’ in the Philippines in 
1986 and Suharto’s in Indonesia in 1998—were regarded as “democratic moments”, 
signaling the process of democratization in the broader region. This comes at a time 
when the dominant discourse from mainstream scholars and policy-makers 
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prophesies that economic liberalization encourages the development of liberal and 
democratic modes of governance. The mainstream assumes that the liberation of a 
self-reliant and progressive middle class from authoritarian rule was a functional 
requirement of well-managed markets. Today, such a claim appears hollow. 
Theoretically, the model of liberal democracy generally proposed in the transitions 
literature was always thin. It alienated the idea of democracy from its social 
connotation as popular power in favor of “formal” and procedural criteria, 
symbolized above all by the holding of regular multi-party elections and the 
“effectiveness” of political institutions. The principles and associated practices of 
people’s sovereignty, including the accountability and responsiveness of 
governments, and political expression and participation by voters and citizens, hardly 
featured at all in this research program. Empirically, Asia appears to demonstrate a 
quite different prospectus from this dominant discourse—characterized by limited 
accountable government, relatively unfree and unfair competitive elections, partially 
curtailed substantial civil and political rights, and compromised associational 
autonomy. In fact, globalization may mean the end of liberal democracy rather than 
its triumphant ascendancy. Historically, if there is any cogent lesson that the past 
two decades have shown about the relationship between democracy and political-
economic regime, it is that a market economy can thrive and survive even without 
democracy (Juego 2008a). Asian elites do not necessarily become forces for political 
liberalism and democracy, they can be downright illiberal and anti-democratic so 
long as it serves their interests (Rodan et al. 2006). 
 
The 1997 Asian crisis accelerated the reorganisation of state authority and 
regulatory frameworks that were already in train long before the crisis in East and 
Southeast Asia. Central to these political-economic forms is “the emergence of the 
new regulatory state, which is directed towards the production of economic and 
social order within a globalised economy” (Jayasuriya 2005; see also Jayasuriya 
2000 and 2001). The rationale behind this attempted transformation of political 
authority is clear. Through the provision of new regulatory frameworks, the state 
seeks to insulate a range of key economic institutions from the influence of 
democratic politics and thereby safeguard the market order. The outcome is an 
explicit linkage between authoritarian politics and a rules-based mode of governance 
in a range of economic policy areas. It is, in Jayasuriya’s (2001: 8) memorable 
phrase, “a politics of anti politics”. 
 
Lessons of the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
 
Looking back on the 1997 Asian financial crisis experience, the political strategies 
and social policies carried out in response to it had been detrimental to 
democratisation, human rights, and the poor. 
 
First, the crisis provided the political, economic, and intellectual justification for 
authoritarian rule—couched in the language of ‘Asian values’—especially among 
Asian elites (notably in Malaysia, Singapore, China, and Thailand). These elites even 
came out to explicitly denounce the inappropriateness of Western European welfare 
state system. 
 
Page 21 of 26 
Second, the crisis had sidelined human rights obligations on civil and political 
rights in the name of surveillance and internal security (such as in Malaysia and 
Singapore) and on social and economic rights in the name of belt-tightening 
measures (resulting in the reduction of social spending in many countries like 
Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand). 
 
And third, the policy responses to the crisis coming from governments and 
international institutions were designed to save and protect the market, businesses, 
and corporations. For instance, the Second Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM-2) held in 
London in 1998 created the “ASEM Trust Fund” which eventually proved to be 
lacking in political will and institutional mechanisms to ensure that the fund targets 
the poor and the workers who were the most vulnerable and adversely affected 
groups during the crisis. 
 
In short, in times of crisis democratization may be stalled, human rights 
compromised, and the poor severely neglected.  
 
The ASEAN 2015 Project Towards a Single Market 
 
The crisis responses of East and Southeast Asian states are bold and explicit that 
there is no backtracking on authoritarian liberalism. The multi-billion dollar economic 
stimulus packages carried out by these countries as well as the multi-million loans 
they have received from the ADB are all directed and oriented towards economic 
growth recovery, private sector assistance, and an open market economy, and less 
on social protection for the poor (see ASEAN Affairs 2008; ADB 2009). Still, in a 
highly volatile political-economic situation there are risks that these billions of dollars 
can generate sharper budget deficits and even lead to another debt crisis. In fact, it 
is in the context of the three successive major economic crises in the last decade—
the 1997 Asia crisis, the 2001 dot-com bubble collapse, and the 2008 Great 
Recession—that a daring project for an ASEAN single market by 2015 has been 
launched following the ratification of the ASEAN Charter on December 2008. Add to 
this, as already mentioned above, is a series of trade and investment agreements in 
the region have been signed and adopted in the first half of 2009, namely: ASEAN 
free trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand, investment and trade in 
goods and services within ASEAN itself; ASEAN investment agreements with South 
Korea and China, and ASEAN trade in goods agreement with India. 
 
All these commitment to an open, competitive market economy are expressed 
only on paper. But the realpolitik is at the national level of individual member 
countries. Asian elites are much more responsive to their personal interests rather 
than their ideological commitment. They can be anti-market and counter-competitive 
so long as it serves their interests.  
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
We have addressed four inter-related themes in this paper with the hope of 
contributing to a critical understanding of the dynamics in contemporary political 
economy in the context of the cacophony of crises in today’s global capitalism: [a] 
the constitutive role of crises in the evolution of neo-liberalism; [b] the mechanisms 
of the recurrence of financial crises with emphasis on the structural instability of 
financial markets to disintegrate that has been exacerbated by the greedy, corrupt, 
and inept economic agents especially the economic elites; [c] the fundamentally 
similar responses of both pro- and anti-neoliberal forces articulated long before the 
global crisis; and [d] the probable strengthening and even acceleration of emergent 
authoritarian liberalism in East and Southeast Asia in the context of the global crisis. 
The discussion in this paper also points to four conclusions. 
 
 First, crises play a constitutive role in the evolution of neo-liberalism. That is 
to say, neo-liberalism was born out of the crises of the mid-1970s, has evolved 
through a series of crises over the last 35 years, and died of the cacophony of crises 
culminating in the current global crisis. (Neo-liberalism has died only in form of 
market fundamentalism, but not in the substance of capitalism as a specific capital-
labor relation and a process of capital accumulation). As it shows, crises have so far 
been functional, rather than dysfunctional, to neo-liberalism in the following sense: 
 
1. Crises reshape class and social relations but in ways that 
perpetuate the hegemony of capital over labour and the 
preservation of elite rule. 
2. Crises restrategize development plans of institutions from 
international organizations to states to further advance, not retreat 
from, market-led development. 
3. Crises restructure states and societies in which social institutions 
are oriented towards the logic, requirements, and imperatives of 
neo-liberalism. 
 
Second, the structure of financial markets is endogenously fragile—that is, long 
periods of stability in the market lead to instability. This inherently unstable structure 
of financial markets is reinforced by the greed, corruption, irresponsibility, and 
ineptitude of economic elites that in turn accelerates and aggravates the crisis. It is 
this vicious structure-agency interaction that keeps financial crises recurring. The 
limitlessness of money, in contrast with the limited nature of other forms capital, in 
the epoch of global capitalism essentially reinforces the domination of finance and 
the stagnation of the real economy. But then again, as the global crisis pushes up 
the limits of the finite planet, the wisdom coming from a prophecy of the Cree 
American Indian tribe is worth a serious reflection: 
 
Only after the last tree has been cut down.  
Only after the last river has been poisoned.  
Only after the last fish has been caught. 
Only then will you find that  money cannot be eaten. 
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It would thus be of crucial importance not to miss this moment of crisis to question 
the limitlessness of money and to rethink invaluable economic activity that is not 
merely reduced to what is valuable. GDP, for instance, is nothing but an aggregate 
of value created in the economy writ large. But treating it as the paramount 
measure of productive economic activity contributes essentially to securing the 
hegemony of the commodification of human life. 
 
Third, people and groups from all ideological positions look at the global crisis 
as both danger and opportunity. They particularly look at the crisis as an opportunity 
to advance their respective causes and interests. The UN Commission of Experts 
(2009) perfectly captures the dynamics of the struggle at hand: 
 
This crisis should be seen as an opportunity to engage in necessary reforms. 
Historically, moments of crises often provide a rare chance for fundamental 
reforms that would otherwise be impossible. But there is also a danger: existing 
power structures can seize hold of these moments of crisis and use them for 
their own benefit, reinforcing inequalities and inequities. There may be a greater 
concentration of economic and political power after the crisis than before. This 
has happened in the past and seems to be happening in this crisis in certain 
countries, as the share of the too-big-to-fail banks has increased even further 
(UN 2009: 36). 
 
Indeed, to explore opportunities is sensible, but the danger posed by the existing 
power structure that has been deeply entrenched in history is a cause for vigilance. 
  
The responses to the global crisis from the multilaterals, to regional 
organizations, to states, and to civil society, coming from either proponents or critics 
of neo-liberal globalization, are fundamentally the same through the years, with or 
without crisis. The pro-neoliberal forces are not retreating from unfettered market-
led development, but rather further advance their longtime pro-market projects and 
programs with stronger and better institutions. And the anti-neoliberal forces 
continue to critic attempts to recover neo-liberalism and reassert their call for 
alternative futures. As the song goes, “The fundamental things apply as time goes 
by.” There are however differential catastrophic impacts across social classes, 
especially among the poor, marginalized, and vulnerable sectors. As always, crises 
all the more inflict insecurity, instability, and ruin on the lives of workers, the 
masses, and the poor.  
 
And finally, there is a movement towards the institutionalization of authoritarian 
liberalism in East and Southeast Asia. It is within this emergent political-economic 
regime (market economies in a framework of authoritarian polities) that countries in 
the region are responding to the crisis.  With the adoption of the ASEAN Charter and 
thereby the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint, the 10 member countries have 
categorically committed themselves to the furtherance of free trade, 
competitiveness, and an open market economy; thus the perpetuation of a neo-
liberal order. However, the feasibility of this vision comes into conflict with the 
realpolitik of the nature of Asian elites—that is, it is their respective interests, not 
ideology, that matter at all times. 
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